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EvidenceCorner | Expert Witnesses

Tender is the Night1:
Should your expert be?
By Cynthia Ford
The 25th Advanced Trial Advocacy School took place in
Missoula at the end of May. It is an intense week-long program,
combining excellent demonstrations of individual parts of a
mock trial by faculty members with actual performances of
the same components by the students in small group with
individuated critique. The students are both actual law students,
who earn academic credit, and practicing lawyers, who earn
CLE credits. The faculty are mostly volunteers from Montana,
selected for both their prowess in the courtroom and their
willingness to give a week of their lives to help improve the
quality of trial advocacy in Montana.
This year, we were also fortunate to have a member of the
faculty at the National College of District Attorneys, who serves
full-time as a state court prosecutor in Memphis, Tennessee.
This highly experienced trial lawyer was assigned to demonstrate
the direct examination of the expert witness. His direct began
with the familiar foundation questions: education, experience, publications, and teaching. These questions, obviously,
are meant to show that the witness is indeed an “expert” and
therefore should be allowed to give an opinion on a subject of
specialized knowledge, to help the jury make its final decision,
per Rule 702.
“YOUR HONOR, I TENDER THE WITNESS AS AN
EXPERT IN (specific field of specialized knowledge)”Heads
snapped around the faculty side of the classroom when our
esteemed visitor completed his foundation questions with this
request, addressed to the presiding judge. In the ensuing discussion, the Tennessean indicated that in his state’s courts, “tendering the witness” is necessary before you can proceed to the
opinion questions. Before the judge grants the request to treat
the witness as an expert in the specified field, she gives opposing counsel an opportunity to voir dire the witness and then to
object to granting expert status to the witness. The judge will finally decide, either accepting or denying the witness as an expert
in the specified field under Rule 702.
In my more than 20 years of coaching the University of
Montana Trial Team, travelling to courthouses around the country, we saw several other teams following this model. In almost
every one of the mock trials where this occurred, either the judge
on the bench or the trial lawyers scoring the round informed
the student-lawyers that “tender” of the expert was improper.
This was rewarding to the UM coaches who had unequivocally
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forbidden our students from formally requesting that the judge
certify the expert. Still, the practice lives on, as the Advanced
Trial demonstration showed…
I decided to do a more lawyerly job of researching my
strongly held belief that trial lawyers do not and should not
formally ask the judge to certify a witness as an “expert” in his or
her field. This research, laid out below, includes Tennessee state
(because that’s what triggered the issue) and Montana state and
federal evidence law.

IS TENDER NECESSARY AS A MATTER OF LAW?
A. TENNESSEE
Tennessee Evidence Rule
Tennessee’s rules of evidence, like Montana’s, appear to be
based largely on the F.R.E. Tennessee’s version of Rule 702
(adopted in 1990) is:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will substantially assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
The only difference between this rule and M.R.E. 702 is the
addition of the word “substantially” in the Tennessee rule. As
in Montana, the rule itself contains no specific requirement that
the court certify that the witness is “qualified as an expert” before
she shares her opinion with the jury.
Tennessee Cases
Two Tennessee appellate cases, one civil and one criminal, indicate that “tender” is not required in that state. Tire
Shredders, Inc. v. ERM-North Central, Inc., 15 S.W. 3d 849,
863-864 (Tenn. Ct. of Appeals, 1999); State v. Williams, 2011
WL 2306246 (Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals at Jackson).
However, in a 2010 case, the Tennessee Court of Criminal
Appeals did affirm a conviction despite the defendant’s allegation that the trial judge committed error in declaring to the
jury, both during testimony and in final instructions, that two
witnesses were experts in their fields. The Court agreed with the
prosecution’s position that the federal disapproval of this procedure did not govern the state courts:
State v. Barlow, W200801128CCAR3CD, 2010 WL 1687772
EXPERT, next page
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(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 26, 2010). Thus, there are both criminal
and civil cases in Tennessee which allow experts to give opinions
without being “tendered” by counsel and “accepted” by the trial
judge as experts per se, and a criminal case which appears to accept the practice without requiring it.
Tennessee Conclusion
Even in Tennessee, a lawyer need not formally tender and a
judge need not formally accept or certify an expert witness.

B. MONTANA, OUR HOME
Montana Evidence Rule 702
Montana’s version of Rule 702 has not been changed since its
adoption in 1978, and is identical to the original federal version.
Rule 702. Testimony by experts. If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.
Like Tennessee’s rule and the federal version, nothing in
M.R.E. 702 deals with the process of getting the expert’s testimony into evidence. There simply is no rule-based requirement
to “tender” or “proffer” the witness prior to asking her for her
opinion.
Montana Cases
There are many Montana Supreme Court cases dealing with
various expert witness issues. None of them overtly discuss the
process of “tendering” an expert, either approving or disapproving of that process. Most importantly, there is no Montana case
which requires a formal proffer and acceptance of the expert witness before she gives her opinion.
The issue of overt tender and acceptance might have been
raised and resolved in a 2005 criminal appeal involving the
admissibility of testimony from handwriting experts. The trial
judge allowed the expert to testify about his comparisons of the
handwriting on various threatening documents, using overhead
projections and blow-ups of trial exhibits. The trial judge also
allowed the expert to give the ultimate opinion that the defendant was the author of the threatening documents. The Montana
Supreme Court affirmed on both claims, and then observed:
Although the District Court did not specifically
rule that Blanco qualified as an expert, Cheryl did not
object to his testimony for lack of qualification. This
Court does not address issues raised for the first time
in this Court. State v. White Bear, 2005 MT 7, ¶ 10,
325 Mont. 337, ¶ 10, 106 P.3d 516, ¶ 10. We decline to
address this argument.
State v. Clifford, 2005 MT 219, 328 Mont. 300, 308,
121 P.3d 489, 495.
The Court did not indicate further whether a specific ruling
that a witness is qualified as an expert is necessary, but my review
of other cases did not find any case directly so holding.

In a 2003 case, the Court began its analysis with a recap of the
general requirements for expert testimony:
¶ 11 We begin our analysis of evidentiary
rulings pertaining to expert witness testimony with the
recognition that the determination of the qualification
of an expert witness is a matter largely within the
discretion of the trial judge and such a determination
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
In re Custody of Arneson–Nelson, 2001 MT 242, 307
Mont. 60, 36 P.3d 874. Additionally, we note that
expert opinion testimony is subject to several caveats.
Under Rule 702, M.R.Evid., opinion evidence from a
qualified expert is admissible if specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue. Such expert testimony
requires that a proper foundation be established.
Expert testimony must also satisfy the relevancy
rules set forth in Article IV of the Montana Rules of
Evidence. Moreover, full disclosure during discovery
under Rule 26, M.R.Civ.P., is designed “to eliminate
surprise and to promote effective cross-examination
of expert witnesses.” Hawkins v. Harney, 2003 MT 58,
¶ 21, 314 Mont. 384, ¶ 21, 66 P.3d 305, ¶ 21 (citation
omitted).
Christofferson v. City of Great Falls, 2003 MT 189,
316 Mont. 469, 473, 74 P.3d 1021, 1025.
Turning to the expert testimony at the trial below, the Court
observed: “The parties presented the necessary foundation to
qualify these medical professionals as experts in their field and
the court accepted both Drs. Knapp and Watson as experts. …
both parties’ expert witnesses presented extensive testimony and
both parties were allowed to fully cross-examine the other party’s
expert. Additionally, the District Court instructed the jury that
they were not bound by either expert’s opinion and that they were
to determine the weight to be given to each expert’s testimony
based upon the expert’s qualifications and credibility. Under
these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the District Court
abused its discretion.” (emphasis added) 2003 MT 189, 316 Mont.
469, 473-74, 74 P.3d 1021, 1025. Notably, the Court did not provide any information about the exact process of this “acceptance,”
or indicate whether or not the parties in fact formally “tendered”
their experts.
In the Christofferson case, in addition to the two medical doctors who were the subjects of above passage, there was an offer of
testimony from the two EMTS who responded to the plaintiff’s
911 call about the decedent’s chance of survival at the time they
arrived at the home. The trial court had not allowed them to give
their opinions; on appeal the Supreme Court affirmed:
We conclude that the opinions Neff and Songer
gave as to the likelihood of resuscibility had they
arrived earlier could not be based on common
knowledge, general experience or scene observation,
but rather required extensive specialized training and
experience. As a result, their testimony fell within the
realm of expert testimony requiring foundation, and
preclusion of it as lay opinion was not an abuse of
discretion.
EXPERT, next page
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Christofferson v. City of Great Falls, 2003 MT 189,
316 Mont. 469, 484, 74 P.3d 1021, 1031.
The opponent moved in limine to exclude the witnesses’
opinions, so the trial judge was not called upon before the jury to
certify—or not—the witnesses’ expertise. This is far preferable to
the “tender” process because it occurs prior to the seating of the
jury.
In another case, decided in 2001, the Court used the term
“acceptance” of the expert: “[We conclude the District Court
did not abuse its discretion in accepting the qualifications of
Dr. Schultz to testify as an expert witness.” State v. Clausell,
2001 MT 62, 305 Mont. 1, 7, 22 P.3d 1111, 1116. However,
the procedural background laid out earlier in the case does not
indicate that there was either any specific tender or any specific
certification of the witness as an expert. Instead, the State offered
a pathologist’s testimony, and the defendant asked to voir dire,
then objected on the basis of foundation. The Court simply ruled
on that objection, overruling it:
¶ 19 During its case-in-chief, the State offered
the expert testimony of Dr. Dwayne Schultz. In
seeking to establish his qualifications as an expert,
Dr. Schultz testified that he was board certified in
Pathology and that he had conducted over four
hundred autopsies, approximately forty of which
involved gunshot wounds. In response to voir dire
by defense counsel, Dr. Schultz admitted he was
not board certified in Forensic Pathology. Clausell’s
attorney then asserted the following objection: “I
would object to this Doctor’s testimony regarding
Forensic Pathology which would include discussions
about homicide cases....” The District Court overruled
the objection and Dr. Schultz testified, among other
things, as to the cause of Trottier’s death, the presence
of soot and powder burns in her skull and brain, the
trajectory of the bullet through her skull and brain,
and the probable orientation of the gun when it was
fired in order for the bullet to achieve its trajectory.
Clausell did not object further to any of Dr. Schultz’s
testimony.
State v. Clausell, 2001 MT 62, 305 Mont. 1, 5-6, 22 P.3d
1111, 1115. This is an example of a good objection and voir dire
during trial: the qualifications of the witness to give an opinion
based on specialized knowledge were fully aired, but neither the
lawyers nor the judge used the label “expert.”
The Supreme Court discussed a similar trial procedure, without any apparent concern, in 1999:
¶ 15 Arrow also called Lawrence Botkin (Mr.
Botkin), a mechanical engineer, to give opinion
testimony concerning kingpin design, abuse, and
misuse, metallurgy, and accident analysis. Appellants
were not satisfied with the foundation laid concerning
Mr. Botkin’s qualifications as an expert witness and
requested permission to voir dire the witness. The
court granted the request. After conducting voir dire,
Appellants objected to Mr. Botkin’s testimony on
www.montanabar.org

the basis of lack of foundation. The court overruled
the objection, stating that the jury could determine
the weight to be afforded Mr. Botkin’s testimony.
(Emphasis added.)
Baldauf v. Arrow Tank & Eng’g Co., Inc., 1999 MT
81, 294 Mont. 107, 111-12, 979 P.2d 166, 170.
It does not appear that Arrow “tendered” the engineer, or in
any other way asked the trial judge to “certify” him as an expert.
The trial judge’s comment that the opponent’s voir dire went to
weight, not admissibility, is a common refrain.
In a much earlier rape case, the Court approved the trial
judge’s ruling that the proffered prosecution expert could give
her opinion, and specifically endorsed the judge’s method of doing so:
The appellant claims that the District Court erred
in leaving the qualification of the expert to the jury
for determination. We disagree. After the appellant
had objected that the witness was not qualified the
court stated, “Well, the court is going to permit her to
testify. If the jury doesn’t believe she is qualified—well
that will be up to the jury to decide.” We find that
the District Court made the determination that the
witness was qualified when it permitted the witness
to testify. The District Court stated afterwards that
the jury could determine the degree of the witness’s
qualification as an expert and weigh the testimony
accordingly. This is proper. The degree of a witness’s
qualification affects the weight rather than the
admissibility of the testimony. Little v. Grizzly Mfg.
(Mont.1981), 636 P.2d 839, 843, 38 St.Rep. 1994,
2000. We hold that the District Court did not err in
allowing this witness to testify. (Emphasis added).
State v. Berg, 215 Mont. 431, 433-34, 697 P.2d
1365, 1367 (1985).
Montana Conclusion
A Montana lawyer, in state court, need not formally tender
and a judge need not formally accept or certify an expert witness.
The cases appear to support my own observation that Montana
lawyers and judges avoid formal tender and acceptance, so that
the Montana practice already conforms to the standards I discuss
below. The few changes I suggest below to articulate this practice
should not be difficult to implement.

C. FEDERAL COURTS
FRE 702
FRE 702 has been amended twice since its initial promulgation in 1975. It now reads2:
RULE 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERT
WITNESSES
A witness who is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
EXPERT, next page
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understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or
data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles
and methods to the facts of the case.
Like the state rules discussed above, the language of F.R.E.
702 discusses the substantive foundation requirements but
not the process for demonstrating that these have been met
before adducing the expert’s opinion. However, the Advisory
Committee Note to the 2000 amendment to Rule 702 specifically identifies the “tender and accept” process as problematic,
although it was not outlawed per se by the amendment:
The amendment continues the practice of the
original Rule in referring to a qualified witness as an
“expert.” This was done to provide continuity and
to minimize change. The use of the term “expert”
in the Rule does not, however, mean that a jury
should actually be informed that a qualified witness
is testifying as an “expert.” Indeed, there is much
to be said for a practice that prohibits the use of the
term “expert” by both the parties and the court at
trial. Such a practice “ensures that trial courts do
not inadvertently put their stamp of authority” on
a witness’ opinion, and protects against the jury’s
being “overwhelmed by the so-called ‘experts.’” Hon.
Charles Richey, Proposals to Eliminate the Prejudicial
Effect of the Use of the Word “Expert” Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence in Criminal and Civil Jury
Trials, 154 F.R.D. 537, 559 (1994) (setting forth
limiting instructions and a standing order employed
to prohibit the use of the term “expert” in jury trials).
(Emphasis added)
The ABA’s Updated Civil Trial Standards (discussed later)
quote from this ACN as support for Trial Standard 14, which
prohibits the tender/accept process before the jury.

U.S. SUPREME COURT
There is no direct guidance from the Supreme Court on
whether experts must, or may, be tendered before giving their
opinion testimony. Both of the two U.S. Supreme Court landmark cases (Daubert and Kumho Tire; see above) on expert
testimony were decided on summary judgment and thus were
about the admissibility of affidavits from experts; no “tender” at
trial occurred, so the cases do not discuss that process.3

THE COURTS OF APPEALS
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits squarely reject the practice of
tender and acceptance of experts. The Sixth Circuit recently considered an appeal from a drug-trafficking conviction where the
trial did include an overt tender of the prosecution witness as an
Page 24

“expert” and “acceptance” by the trial judge in front of the jury:
Officer Dews then was permitted to testify as an
expert that the activity that he observed constituted
drug trafficking:
MR. OAKLEY [AUSA]: And, Your Honor, we
would ask that the witness be identified as an expert
in the identification and behavior of street-level
narcotics trafficking.
THE COURT: Mr. Cohen?
MR. COHEN: No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Officer Dews will
be accepted as an expert in the area of streetlevel narcotics transactions and behaviors that
accompany that activity. (Emphasis added)
United States v. Johnson, 488 F.3d 690, 694 (6th Cir. 2007).
Because the defendant did not object to this expert testimony at
trial, his appeal on this ground was decided under the plain error
doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the admission of the
expert testimony but took the opportunity to register its disapproval of the tender/acceptance process:
We pause here to comment on the procedure used
by the trial judge in declaring before the jury that
Officer Dews was to be considered an expert. Other
courts have articulated good reasons disapproving of
such practices, with which we agree. See, e.g., United
States v. Bartley, 855 F.2d 547, 552 (8th Cir.1988)
(noting that “[s]uch an offer and finding by the
Court might influence the jury in its evaluation of
the expert and the better procedure is to avoid an
acknowledgment of the witnesses’ expertise by the
Court”); State v. McKinney, 185 Ariz. 567, 917 P.2d
1214, 1233 (1996) (observing that “[b]y submitting
the witness as an expert in the presence of the jury,
counsel may make it appear that he or she is seeking
the judge’s endorsement that the witness is to be
considered an expert.... In our view, the trial judge
should discourage procedures that may make it
appear that the court endorses the expert status
of the witness. The strategic value of the process
is quite apparent but entirely improper”). When
a court certifies that a witness is an expert, it lends
a note of approval to the witness that inordinately
enhances the witness’s stature and detracts from
the court’s neutrality and detachment. “Except
in ruling on an objection, the court should not,
in the presence of the jury, declare that a witness
is qualified as an expert or to render an expert
opinion, and counsel should not ask the court to do
so.” ABA Civil Trial Practice Standard 17 (Feb.1998);
see also Jones, Rosen, Wegner & Jones, Rutter Group
Practice Guide: Federal Civil Trials & Evidence
§ 8:1548.1 (The Rutter Group 2006). Instead, the
proponent of the witness should pose qualifying
EXPERT, next page
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and foundational questions and proceed to elicit
opinion testimony. If the opponent objects, the
court should rule on the objection, allowing the
objector to pose voir dire questions to the witness’s
qualifications if necessary and requested. See Berry
v. McDermid Transp., Inc., 2005 WL 2147946, at
*4 (S.D.Ind. Aug.1, 2005) (stating that “counsel for
both parties should know before trial that the court
does not ‘certify’ or declare witnesses to be ‘experts’
when ‘tendered’ as such at trial. Instead, if there is
an objection to an offered opinion, the court will
consider the objection. The court’s jury instructions
will refer to ‘opinion witnesses’ rather than ‘expert
witnesses’ ”); see also Jordan v. Bishop, 2003 WL
1562747, at *2 (S.D.Ind. Feb.14, 2003). The court
should then rule on the objection, “to the extent
practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence
from being suggested to the jury by any means.”
Fed.R.Evid. 103(c). (Emphasis added).
United States v. Johnson, 488 F.3d 690, 697-98 (6th
Cir. 2007).
(Three state cases have declined to follow this aspect of the
Johnson case4 but the large majority of cases which cite Johnson
on this point do so with approval.) See, also U.S. v. Kozminski,
821 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1987), aff’d in part and remanded in part,
487 U.S. 931, 108 S.Ct. 2751, 101 L.Ed.2d 788 (1988) (“Although
the practice is different in some state courts, the Federal Rules
of Evidence do not call for the proffer of an expert after he has
stated his general qualifications. In Kozminski, this court counseled against putting some general seal of approval on an expert
after he has been qualified but before any questions have been
posed to him. The issue with regard to expert testimony is not
the qualifications of a witness in the abstract, but whether those
qualifications provide a foundation for a witness to answer a
specific question.”)
In U.S. v. Bartley, 855 F.2d 547, 552 (8th Cir. 1988), the appellant alleged error in the prosecution’s failure to proffer as, and
the trial court’s failure to make a specific finding that the witness
was, an “expert.” He contended that this process violated both
F.R.E. 702 and his Confrontation right. The conviction stood:
Although it is for the court to determine whether
a witness is qualified to testify as an expert, there
is no requirement that the court specifically make
that finding in open court upon proffer of the
offering party. Such an offer and finding by the
Court might influence the jury in its evaluation of
the expert and the better procedure is to avoid an
acknowledgement of the witnesses’ expertise by
the Court. This court, therefore, finds no error in
the admission of the testimony of Mr. Wagenhofer
and the analytical report and exhibits identifying the
presence of cocaine in the substance obtained from
Bartley. (Emphasis added).
United States v. Bartley, 855 F.2d 547, 552 (8th Cir.
1988).
www.montanabar.org

The Fifth Circuit considered an appeal in which the alleged
error was the judge’s comment to the jury that the witness was
not testifying as an expert. It did not directly decide whether the
comment was error, but did cite to Johnson in its discussion and
held that if there was error, it was not grounds for reversal:
The Government objected to Talley providing
expert testimony, arguing that Talley’s expertise in
accounting was not relevant to whether Sepeda’s
investigation was adequate. The district court
sustained the objection and advised the jury as
follows:
“Members of the jury, yesterday right before the
break, the government had made an objection to Mr.
Talley’s testimony concerning certain accounting
principles. The court sustains the government’s
objection. Mr. Talley will be testifying, however, he
will not be testifying as an expert based upon the four
accounting principles that you heard testified about
yesterday.”…
Ollison argues that the district court’s instruction
“degraded” Talley’s testimony by stating that Talley
was not an expert. She observes that the district court
did not give a similar instruction regarding Sepeda’s
opinion testimony.
Because the district court was ruling on the
Government’s objection, we find that the error, if
any, was harmless. See United States v. Johnson, 488
F.3d 690, 697-98 (6th Cir.2007) (“Except in ruling on
an objection, the court should not, in the presence of
the jury, declare that a witness is qualified as an expert
or to render an expert opinion, and counsel should
not ask the court to do so.”) (citation omitted). … The
district court’s instruction did not “degrade” Talley’s
testimony because both Talley and Sepeda testified
as lay witnesses and gave their respective opinions.
(Emphasis added)
United States v. Ollison, 555 F.3d 152, 163-64 (5th Cir.
2009).
The Johnson reference appears to be favorable, but this is at
most a lukewarm adoption of the Johnson prohibition against labeling witnesses as “experts” (or not); I hesitate to base a categorization of the Fifth Circuit on this issue on this language.
In the Third Circuit, another district court judge refused an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, where the defense counsel
did not object to qualifying the witness before the jury. Again,
the Court of Appeals recognized the Johnson case:
Napoli then contends that his counsel erred by
not objecting when the court stated that Schwartz
qualified as an expert in narcotics and code language
in front of the jury. Napoli contends that Schwartz
should have been qualified as an expert outside of
the presence of the jury because the court may have
appeared to endorse Schwartz by stating in front of
the jury that he was permitted to testify as an expert.
EXPERT, next page
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At least one court outside of this circuit has
disapproved of counsel performing voir dire of an
expert witness in the presence of the jury. See United
States v. Johnson, 488 F.3d 690, 697 (6th Cir.2007).
That said, the cases which Napoli cites from within
this circuit do not prohibit a court from qualifying
an expert in the presence of the jury. See Schneider
v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir.2003); Bruno v.
Merv Griffin’s Resorts Int’l Casino Hotel, 37 F.Supp.2d
395, 398 (E.D.Pa.1999). Moreover, the government
offered to conduct the voir dire outside the presence
of the jury, but Napoli’s counsel stated that voir dire
typically occurred in front of a jury and so should
in this case. This accordingly appears to have been a
strategic decision of counsel. (Emphasis added.)
United States v. Napoli, CRIM.A. 07-75-1, 2012 WL
4459584 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2012).
The Tenth Circuit also obliquely addressed this issue, in an
en banc decision affirming the in limine exclusion of a defense
expert in the insider trading prosecution of a Qwest executive:
Though Mr. Nacchio’s expectation that Professor
Fischel’s admissibility would be established after he
took the stand may have been reasonable, see, e.g.,
Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 215 F.3d
1083, 1087 (10th Cir.2000), Mr. Nacchio had no
entitlement to a particular method of gatekeeping
by the district court. Indeed, Mr. Nacchio’s
purported entitlement is squarely at odds with the
directive in Kumho Tire that “[t]he trial judge must
have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular
case how to go about determining whether particular
expert testimony is reliable.” 526 U.S. at 152, 119
S.Ct. 1167. The district court’s failure to proceed as
Mr. Nacchio anticipated does not by itself constitute
an abuse of discretion.11 See id. (“The trial court must
have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to
test an expert’s reliability, and to decide whether or
when special briefing or other proceedings are needed
to investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides
whether or not that expert’s relevant testimony is
reliable.”). (Emphasis added).
United States v. Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234, 1244-46
(10th Cir. 2009).
In Nacchio, the judge granted a motion in limine to exclude
the expert testimony, so there was neither foundational testimony on the stand nor any formal tender in front of the jury.
I have not been able to find any Ninth Circuit decision
specifically commenting on the tender/acceptance method of
qualifying expert witnesses. However, there is a published decision from the U.S. District Court for Arizona, located in the
circuit, on point. The case was a habeas case, decided in 2009.
The defendant alleged, inter alia, that the Arizona state court
judge’s “conferring of expert witness status” violated his right to

due process and a fair trial.
The claim refers to the prosecutor’s practice of
submitting certain witnesses as experts in their fields;
after laying a foundation for the witness’s expertise,
the prosecutor stated that he “submitted” the witness
as an expert. Defense counsel did not object when this
occurred, and the court made no comment beyond
telling the prosecutor that he “may proceed.”
McKinney v. Ryan, CV 03-774-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 2432738
(D. Ariz. Aug. 10, 2009). This same claim had been raised on
direct appeal. The Arizona Supreme Court disapproved of the
process but, as in U.S. v. Ollison, supra, did not find it to be the
error to be reversible:
The witnesses’ testimony concerned technical and
scientific subjects beyond the common experience of
people of ordinary education. Thus, we find no abuse
of discretion in the judge’s admission of the witnesses’
opinion testimony.
We do not recommend, however, the process of
submitting a witness as an expert. The trial judge
does not decide whether the witness is actually an
expert but only whether the witness is “qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education ... [to] testify ... in the form of an opinion
or otherwise.” Ariz.R.Evid. 702. By submitting the
witness as an expert in the presence of the jury,
counsel may make it appear that he or she is seeking
the judge’s endorsement that the witness is to be
considered an expert. The trial judge, of course, does
not endorse the witness’s status but only determines
whether a sufficient foundation has been laid in terms
of qualification for the witness to give opinion or
technical testimony. See United States v. Bartley, 855
F.2d 547, 552 (8th Cir.1988) (“Although it is for the
court to determine whether a witness is qualified to
testify as an expert, there is no requirement that the
court specifically make that finding in open court
upon proffer of the offering party”).
In our view, the trial judge should discourage
procedures that may make it appear that the court
endorses the expert status of the witness. The
strategic value of the process is quite apparent but
entirely improper. Suppose, as is frequently the
case, there are two experts with conflicting opinions.
Is the trial judge to endorse them both or only one?
In our view, the answer is neither. The trial judge is
only to determine whether one or the other or both
are qualified to give opinion or technical evidence.
“Such an offer and finding [of expert status] by the
Court might influence the jury in its evaluation of
the expert and the better procedure is to avoid an
acknowledgement of the witnesses’ expertise by the
Court.” Id. Thus, we disapprove of the procedure
EXPERT, next page
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followed in this case. (Emphasis supplied).
State v. McKinney, 185 Ariz. 567, 585-86, 917 P.2d
1214, 1232-33 (1996).
The federal district court in the habeas case agreed, holding
“the irregularities with which the expert testimony was introduced did not affect the fundamental fairness of Petitioner’s trial.
Petitioner does not contest that the witnesses were experts by
virtue of their experience and training and that their testimony
was admissible.” McKinney v. Ryan, CV 03-774-PHX-DGC,
2009 WL 2432738 (D. Ariz. Aug. 10, 2009).
Another state court in the Ninth Circuit has approved a trial
judge’s refusal to state before the jury that a particular witness is
an “expert”:
The circuit court denied Plaintiffs’ requests to
qualify Dr. Bretan as an expert. The circuit court
also denied Plaintiffs’ request to qualify Nurse
Carol Best as an expert, stating, “Inasmuch as this
Court does not comment on the evidence and
announce whether or not a particular witness is
qualified as an expert in a particular field, the Court
respectfully denies the request.” …it appears that it
was the circuit court’s practice to not make findings
before the jury as to the qualifications of any expert
witnesses. Although the record on appeal does not
contain an explanation of that practice, we note that
the parties signed a pretrial conference order dated
March 14, 2006 which states as follows under “other
topics”: “Expert witnesses (no need to qualify).” Also,
Defendants did not move the circuit court to qualify
any of their witnesses as experts. Moreover, the
circuit court ruled in limine that Dr. Bretan was not
precluded from giving expert testimony as to cause
of death at trial, but that Plaintiffs would need to
establish a sufficient foundation for his opinion at that
time. Thus, although there is nothing in the record
explaining the court’s approach toward qualifying
expert witnesses, it does not appear that the court
was singling out Plaintiffs in applying its policy or
expressing hostility toward them, or their witnesses.
Nor can we say from the record before us that the
circuit court’s approach to qualifying expert witnesses
constituted an abuse of discretion.
In reaching that conclusion, we do not suggest
that the circuit court was required to take the
approach which it took, but rather that it was not an
abuse of discretion for it to do so. While the concerns
identified in note 12 supra are legitimate, they can
also be addressed by other means, such as by giving
cautionary instructions to the jury regarding the
weight to be given to testimony by expert witnesses.
See United States v. Hawley, 562 F.Supp.2d 1017,
1036 (N.D.Iowa 2008) (noting, with regard to
concerns about a court referring to a witness as an
expert, that “such potential prejudice can be avoided
www.montanabar.org

by instructing jurors on the way in which they are
to determine what weight to give to a purported
‘expert’s’ opinion”) (citation omitted). Such
instructions are consistent with the principle that
“[o]nce the basic requisite qualifications are
established, the extent of an expert’s knowledge of
the subject matter goes to the weight rather than the
admissibility of the testimony.” Larsen, 64 Haw. at
304, 640 P.2d at 288 (citations omitted); Commentary
to HRE Rule 702 (“The trier of fact may nonetheless
consider the qualifications of the witness in
determining the weight to be given to the testimony.”)
(Citation and footnotes omitted).
Barbee v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 119 Haw. 136, 154-55,
194 P.3d 1098, 1116-17.
Federal Conclusion
In federal court in some circuits, a lawyer may not formally
tender and a judge may not formally accept or certify an expert
witness. In other circuits, the practice has not been outlawed but
is not required. The Ninth Circuit has not yet definitively ruled
on this issue.

WHAT IS WRONG WITH TENDERING A WITNESS TO
BE FORMALLY ACCEPTED BY THE COURT AS AN
EXPERT?
Many secondary authorities have criticized, the practice of
tendering an expert for acceptance or certification by the court
at trial, in the presence of the jury. This was one of the subjects
of the ABA’s original Civil Trial Practice Standards, adopted in
1998. The ABA website explains the purposes of those standards:
They recommend procedures and otherwise
furnish guidance that is not available elsewhere and
are designed to foster and ensure a fair trial in both
state and federal court.
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/policy/
civil_trial_standards.html (accessed June 26, 2013).
Those standards were recently reviewed and revised; the
current version, known as the “Updated Civil Trial Standards,”
was adopted by the ABA Section in August 2007. The
Updated Standards are available in .pdf format at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/
litigation/ctps.authcheckdam.pdf
The Preface to the Updated Standards states:
These Updated Civil Trial Practice Standards have
been developed as guidelines to assist judges and
lawyers who try civil cases in state and federal court.
The Updated Standards address practical aspects of
trial that are not fully addressed by rules of evidence
or procedure. They are not intended to be a substitute
for existing evidentiary or procedural rules but rather
to supplement and operate consistently with those
rules. The Updated Standards are predicated on the
EXPERT, next page
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recognition that, in an era of increasingly complicated
evidence and litigation, there are methods for
enhancing jury comprehension and minimizing jury
confusion that merit wider consideration and use.
(Emphasis added).
Section 14 of the Updated Civil Trial Standards deals with the
process of qualifying expert witnesses:
PART FOUR: EXPERT AND SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE
14. “Qualifying” Expert Witnesses. The court
should not, in the presence of the jury, declare that a
witness is qualified as an expert or to render an expert
opinion, and counsel should not ask the court to do
so.
As with the FRE and the MRE, the drafters of the Updated
Standards provided “Comments” to supplement each standard.
Although “The accompanying commentary has not been
adopted by the ABA House of Delegates and, as such, should
not be construed as representing the policy of the Association”
Ioriginal emphasis],they are helpful in understanding the standards. The Comment to Standard 14 states, in part:
It is not uncommon for a proponent of expert
testimony to tender an expert witness to the court,
following a recitation of the witness’s credentials and
before eliciting an opinion, in an effort to secure a
ruling that the witness is “qualified” as an expert in
a particular field. The tactical purpose, from the
proponent’s perspective, is to obtain a seeming
judicial endorsement of the testimony to follow. It
is inappropriate for counsel to place the court in
that position.
A judicial ruling that a proffered expert is
“qualified” is unnecessary unless an objection is
made to the expert’s testimony. If an objection is
made to an expert’s qualifications, relevancy of expert
testimony, reliability or any other aspect of proffered
expert testimony, the court need only sustain or
overrule the objection. When the court overrules an
objection, there is no need for the court to announce
to the jury that it has found that a witness is an
expert or that expert testimony will be permitted.
The use of the term “expert” may appear to a jury
to be a kind of judicial imprimatur that favors the
witness. There is no more reason for the court to
explain why an opinion will be permitted or to
use the term “expert” than there is for the court
to announce that an out-of-court statement is an
excited utterance in response to a hearsay objection.
(Emphasis added).
The Comment quotes from both the Advisory Committee
Note to the 2000 Amendment to F.R.E. 702 (laid out in the F.R.E.
section of this column) and from an article which that Advisory
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Committee Note cited as well:
As United States District Judge Charles R. Richey
has observed in a related context, “It may be an
inappropriate judicial comment ... for the court to
label a witness an ‘expert.’” Hon. Charles R. Richey,
Proposals to Eliminate the Prejudicial Effect of the
Use of the Word “Expert” Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence in Civil and Criminal Jury Trials, 154 F.R.D.
537, 554 (1994). The prejudicial effect of this practice
is accentuated in cases in which only one side can
afford to, or does, proffer expert testimony.
Professor Stephen Saltzburg, who was a member of both the
ABA original and updated Task Forces on Civil Trial Standards,
published an article in Criminal Justice magazine in 2010, in
which he addressed just this issue. Prof. Saltzburg hits the nail
on the head so I simply replicate his language here:
Long ago, I wrote in Criminal Justice magazine
about the problems when judges anoint experts and
explained why it is unnecessary and unwise for jurors
to be told that the judge has “qualified” a witness as an
“expert.” (Testimony from an Opinion Witness: Avoid
Using the Word “Expert” at Trial, 9 Crim. Just. 35-38
(Summer, 1994).) The American Bar Association’s
Civil Trial Standards agree:
14. “Qualifying” Expert Witnesses. The court
should not, in the presence of the jury, declare that a
witness is qualified as an expert or to render an expert
opinion, and counsel should not ask the court to do
so….
If judges simply rule on objections to testimony
by sustaining or overruling them and permitting lay
witnesses to offer permissible opinions under Fed.
R. Evid. 701, expert witnesses to offer permissible
opinions under Fed. R. Evid. 702, and dual witnesses
to offer both lay and expert opinions, there is no
reason for a trial judge to qualify a witness as an
expert and no reason for the judge to instruct the
jury on the dual roles that a witness plays. If the jury
is not told that a witness is an “expert,” it can judge
the totality of the witness’s testimony for what it is
worth….
The reality is that the process of tendering a
witness and an expert and having the court find the
witness to be an expert is problematic in all cases…
(Emphasis added). 25-Fall Crim.Just. 32, 34-35.
My particular favorite secondary source on federal trial
practice is Wright and Miller. Here is what they say about the
procedure to be employed in presenting expert testimony:
Rule 702 does not require that courts employ any
specific procedure for receiving evidence concerning
expert qualifications. Normally a trial court will hear
qualification evidence before permitting the witness
to give opinion testimony. That hearing may take
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place either in the presence or absence of the jury, at
the discretion of the court. Before the court rules on
whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert,
the opposing party should be afforded an opportunity
to conduct a voir dire examination of the witness
concerning the witness’s qualifications.
In some jurisdictions the practice is to proffer
the witness as an expert after eliciting evidence as
to his credentials. This proffer precipitates a ruling
from the court as to whether the witness is qualified
to testify as an expert. This procedure is not
mandated by Rule 702. The trial court need not and
often should not make a finding before the jury that
a witness is qualified to testify as an expert since
such a finding might induce the jury to give too
much weight to the witness’s testimony. In addition,
it is often premature for a court to find a witness
qualified to testify as a expert even after that witness’s
credentials have been fully presented. This is because,
until specific questions are posed to the witness, the
court cannot know if the witness is qualified as an
expert in the area of inquiry.
Even after a judge has permitted a witness to
testify as an expert, cross-examination concerning
the witness’s qualifications should be allowed so that
the jury may properly weigh the witness’s testimony.
(Footnotes omitted; emphasis added)
§ 6265 General Rule—“Qualified as an Expert”, 29
Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 6265 (1st ed.)
All of these authorities agree: as a matter of policy, both
lawyers and judges should refrain from using the term “expert”
when referring either to a witness or her testimony. Instead, the
recitation of the witness’ qualifications, and voir dire and crossexamination by the opponent, should suffice to help the jury
assign the proper weight to be given to the witness’ opinions.

ANOTHER ISSUE TO CONSIDER: SHOULD
LAWYERS BE ALLOWED TO ASK AN EXPERT
WHETHER SHE HAS EVER BEEN QUALIFIED TO
TESTIFY IN ANOTHER COURT PROCEEDING?
This issue is tangential to the main subject of this article, but
worth considering as well. I agree with the conclusion of the
authors of an article in the Review of Litigation, which discusses
this question in depth:
A prior witness’s knowledge, proficiency, and
experience should be assessed when considering
whether he or she is qualified to testify as an expert.
Evidence that judges in other cases deemed the
witness to be an expert, however, is inadmissible
hearsay and opinion evidence. The presentation
of this evidence is simply an effort to support the
witness in a way that is often unduly prejudicial….

accordingly, the questionable questions regarding an
expert’s prior qualification and/or disqualification
simply should be forbidden. (Emphasis added).
Irving Prager & Kevin S. Marshall, Examination of
Prior Expert Qualification and/or Disqualification(Questionable Questions Under the Rules of
Evidence), 24 Rev. Litig. 559, 579 (2005).

WHAT SHOULD MONTANANS DO?
Montana should follow the preferred practice of omitting
any “expert” stamp on a particular witness or testimony in a
jury trial. Because most Montana lawyers and judges already do
so, this recommendation should not cause any great difficulty.
However, because lawyers from other jurisdictions do appear
here pro hac vice, or move here permanently, Montana should
affirmatively and clearly voice its agreement with ABA Updated
Civil Trial Standard 14.
The Comment to the ABA Updated Civil Trial Standard 14
ends with some practical advice which instructs both advocates
and judges on how to comply:
This Standard suggests that the court should
not use the term “expert” and that the proponent
of the evidence should not ask the court to do so.
The party objecting to evidence also has a role to
play in assuring that the court does not appear to be
anointing a witness as an “expert.” A party objecting
that a witness is not qualified to render an opinion or
that a subject matter not the proper subject of expert
testimony should avoid using the word “expert”
in the presence of the jury. Any objection in the
presence of the jury should be “to the admissibility of
the witness’ opinion.” If the objecting party objects
that testimony is inadmissible “expert” testimony
and the court overrules the objection, it may appear
that the judge has implicitly found the witness to
be an “expert.” When an objection is made, if the
proponent wishes to argue the matter, it should be
outside the hearing of the jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 103
(c ) (providing that inadmissible evidence should not
be heard by the jury).
The Montana Supreme Court
The Montana Supreme Court should clearly adopt Standard
14 of the ABA Updated Civil Trial Standards for all state trials.
The best way to do that is to amend the Uniform District Court
Rules5 by adding a new rule entitled “Procedure for Qualifying
Experts.” Additionally, UDCR 5, “Pre-trial Order and Pre-trial
Conference” should be amended to add a similar provision into
the required form for the Pre-trial Order. The Comment to the
ABA Updated Standard 14 contains helpful suggestions.
Based on those, I suggest that a new UDCR read as follows:
Procedure for Qualifying Experts. In a jury trial,
neither the court nor the lawyers should, in the
hearing of the jury, use the term “expert” in referring
to any witness, testimony, or opinion. The proponent
of such evidence should not ask the court to do so,
EXPERT, next page
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for instance by “tendering” the witness as an “expert”
or asking the court to “accept” or “certify” the witness
as an expert. The party objecting to evidence on
the basis that the witness is not qualified to render
an opinion or that a subject matter not the proper
subject of expert testimony should not use the word
“expert” in the presence of the jury. Any objection
in the presence of the jury should be “to foundation”
or “to the admissibility of the witness’ opinion.” The
lawyers and judge may use the term “Rule 702” in
argument and ruling before the jury, but not the title
of that rule nor any language from it which refers to
“experts.”
This rule does not apply to motions, hearings, or rulings outside the hearing of the jury.
UDCR 5(c) should also be amended to add a section to the
Pre-Trial6 Order, so that every litigant is informed of the correct
procedure prior to trial and knows she may be subject to sanctions for violation of a court order for non-compliance:
Treatment of Expert Witnesses. No party shall,
in the presence of the jury, request that a witness be
declared, certified, accepted or otherwise recognized
as “an expert.” No party shall, in the presence of
the jury, refer to any testimony as “expert.” Such
witnesses and testimony may be called “opinion
witnesses” and “opinion testimony.”
Alternatively, the Court could indicate in its next case involving expert testimony that henceforth Montana will follow the
ABA Updated Trial Standard 14.
Montana Pattern Jury Instructions
The benefits of the practice of not labeling particular witnesses or testimony as “expert” will be lost if the jury instructions
themselves do not comply. As Professor Saltzburg et al observed:
The utility of the Standard can be undermined if
the court is not careful to excise the term “expert”
from the instructions it gives to the jury before it
deliberates. Juries can be fully instructed on their role
in assessing credibility without any mention of the
term. The following instruction is illustrative:
Some witnesses who testify claim to have special
knowledge, skill, training, experience or education
that enable them to offer opinions or inferences
concerning issues in dispute. The fact that a witness
has knowledge, skill, training, experience or education
does not require you to believe the witness, to give
such a witness’s testimony any more weight than that
of any other witness, or to give it any weight at all. It
is important for you to keep in mind that the witness
is not the trier of fact. You are the trier of fact. It is
for you to decide whether the testimony of a witness,
including any opinions or inferences of the witness,
assists you in finding the facts and deciding the issues
that are in dispute. And, it is for you to decide what
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weight to give the testimony of a witness, including
any opinions or inferences of the witness.
6 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin, &
Daniel J. Capra, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual
144 ((8th ed. 2002) .
The current (2009) version of the Montana Criminal Jury
Instructions do use the term “expert:”
INSTRUCTION NO. [1-113]
[Expert Witness]
A witness who by education and experience has
become expert in any art, science, profession or
calling may be permitted to state an opinion as to a
matter in which the witness is versed and which is
material to the case, and may also state the reasons
for such opinion. You should consider each expert
opinion received in evidence in this case and give it
such weight as you think it deserves; and you may
reject it entirely if you conclude the reasons given in
support of the opinion are unsound.
This could be easily amended by simply removing the word
“expert” and substituting in the first sentence “has gained specialized knowledge.” (While we are at it, shouldn’t it be “by education OR experience?” See M.R.E. 702). The second sentence is
even easier: just omit “expert” and retain “opinion.”
Similarly, the Montana Civil Pattern Jury Instructions need
tweaking to excise the term “expert.” Civil Pattern Instruction
1.12 now reads:
A witness who has special knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education in a particular
science, profession or occupation may give his/her
opinion as an expert as to any matter in which he/
she is skilled. In determining the weight to be given
such opinion you should consider the qualifications
and credibility of the expert and the reasons given for
his/her opinion. You are not bound by such opinion.
Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it
entitled.
This instruction could be fixed easily by simply deleting the
first bolded phrase, and for the second bolded phrase substituting
“the witness” for “the expert.”
Civil Pattern Instruction 3.06 is entitled “Professional
Negligence—Expert Testimony—When Not Required.” It
instructs:
The testimony of an expert is ordinarily required
to establish the appropriate standard of care owed by
a doctor to his/her patient. However, the law permits
an exception where you, as lay persons, are able to say
as a matter of common knowledge and observation
that it is plain and obvious that the injury the patient
has establish could not have been sustained if due care
had been exercised.
I do not think this pattern instruction needs to be amended
globally, because it is sets forth the substantive requirement for
EXPERT, next page
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If, however, the motion in limine procedure is not used,
then at trial neither the lawyers nor the judge should use the
label “expert” at any point before the jury. The proponent of the
expert testimony, rather than describes a particular witness as an
testimony should simply ask the witness the opinion question.7
expert. Further, this instruction normally is used in the absence
The proponent should not say to the judge “I tender/offer this
of an expert, rather than where one has testified. However,
witness as an expert in (specified field).”
courts and counsel should consider changing the language if the
The opponent should simply object: “Objection. Foundation,
circumstances of the individual case mean that the instruction
Rule 702” and add a request: “May I voir dire?” The voir dire is
might be construed to violate Updated Civil Trial Standard 14.
a mini cross-examination, the only purpose of which is to show
Montana District Courts
the court that this witness in fact does not meet the requirements
The Montana District Courts should include in their Local
of Rule 702 and thus should not be allowed to give his or her
Rules provisions which mirror the suggested UDCR amendopinion. Here is an example:
ments above, at least until such time as the UDCR are amended
Q: It is not really “Dr.”, is it, Mr. Jones?
(and afterwards, if the UDCR truly do govern only civil cases).
A. I don’t know what you mean.
Additionally, each trial judge should include in all his or her PreQ. Well, you never attended any medical school
Trial Orders similar language so that the parties are aware of the
in
the
U.S., did you?
trial judge’s adherence to this practice in his or her courtroom.
A. No.
The court should forbid the tender of expert witnesses in front
of the jury, and should refuse to accept or certify any witness as
Q. And you never attended any medical school
an “expert.” Thus, the judge’s role is to assess and rule on any
outside the U.S., did you?
foundation objections raised when the expert with specialized
A. No.
knowledge is asked for his or her opinion.
Q. You do not actually have an M.D. degree, do
Lastly, the court should ensure that its jury instructions do
you?
not undo the good obtained by the trial process. The quotation
A. Not yet.
from Professor Saltzburg et al, set forth in the earlier discussion
Q. And you failed the First Aid training class in
about Pattern Jury Instructions, should be implemented immeCub Scouts, didn’t you?
diately, even before the Pattern Instructions are amended. This
A. Well, that was a long time ago, but yes.
is the language they suggest:
Q. You haven’t passed any First Aid training class
Some witnesses who testify claim to have special
since
then, have you?
knowledge, skill, training, experience or education
that enable them to offer opinions or inferences
A. No.
concerning issues in dispute. The fact that a witness
Q. You have never been licensed as a physician in
has knowledge, skill, training, experience or
any state in the U.S.?
education does not require you to believe the witness,
A. No.
to give such a witness’s testimony any more weight
Q. You have never been licensed as a physician in
than that of any other witness, or to give it any weight
any
country in the world, have you?
at all. It is important for you to keep in mind that
A.
No.
the witness is not the trier of fact. You are the trier of
Q. You have never worked in any capacity in an
fact. It is for you to decide whether the testimony of
Emergency Room anywhere in the U.S.?
a witness, including any opinions or inferences of the
witness, assists you in finding the facts and deciding
A. No.
the issues that are in dispute. And, it is for you to
Q. Nor in the world?
decide what weight to give the testimony of a witness,
A. No.
including any opinions or inferences of the witness.
Q. You have never once, anywhere, cared for a
6 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin, &
patient as an emergency room doctor, have you?
Daniel J. Capra, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual
A. No.
144 ((8th ed. 2002).
Q. And you bought your scrubs on EBay?
A. Some, and some from the hospital thrift shop.
Montana Lawyers
A. Motion in Limine to Exclude a Listed Expert
Q. Isn’t it true that the only thing which you know
Montana lawyers, in both state and federal court, should
about emergency medicine is what you have learned
attempt to resolve disputes about the admissibility of expert
from watching the TV show “ER”?
testimony under Rule 702 before trial, through motions in liA. No. I also watched “Doogie Howser.”
mine, if at all possible. This process does not require the caution
“Your honor, I renew my objection to this witness
necessary when arguing this issue before the jury at trial, and has
giving any opinion under Rule 702.”
the even more important benefit of giving the court and parties
Now the judge simply rules on the objection. In this
enough time to carefully consider the question raised.
B. Objection at Trial
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the evidence and weigh the credibility of the witnesses.
Defendant relies on United States v. Johnson, 488 F.3d
690 (6th cir.2007), in support of his argument…

EXPERT, from previous page

example, it is obvious that the witness does not meet even the
relaxed Daubert standard reflected in Rule 702, so the objection
would be sustained and the witness prohibited from giving any
opinion on the basis that he does not have the specialized knowledge that would be helpful to the jury. The judge only has to say
“Sustained” without using the word “expert.”
If the example were less clear, so that although the witness
did not graduate from Harvard Medical School, she did obtain
an M.D. from the University of Mississippi and has practiced in
an ER for a few years, the judge might let her give her opinion.
To do so, the judge should only say “Overruled. She may give
her opinion” and should not go on to say “I find that she is an
expert.”
C. Recommended Motion in Limine to Preclude Use of
“Expert” Label at Trial
As the authorities discussed above recognize, there is a strong
temptation to have the judge state, before the jury, that your
witness is an expert. “The tactical purpose, from the proponent’s
perspective, is to obtain a seeming judicial endorsement of the
testimony to follow.” Comment to A.B.A. Updated Civil Trial
Standard 14. If one lawyer does this, her opponent naturally will
want to follow suit to make sure that the jury considers the other
expert in the same light. Mutual disarmament is the solution,
and a procedural motion in limine is the way to do it.
A recent federal district court opinion shows how a good
advocate can ensure compliance with the Johnson and ABA
Guidelines by using a motion in limine:
Defendant requests that the Court issue a pretrial
evidentiary ruling barring the Government from
requesting in the presence of the jury that one or
more of its witnesses be declared an expert. Defendant
also requests that no witness be referred to as an
expert or their testimony referenced as an expert
opinion. Defendant asserts that such references would
improperly invade the province of the jury to evaluate

United States v. Cobb, CR-2-07-0236, 2008 WL
2120845 (S.D. Ohio May 19, 2008). Your brief
in support of your motion should cite the A.B.A.
Updated Civil Trial Standard 14 as well as the cases I
have discussed above, particularly U.S. v. Johnson.
Because I think that a good motion always includes a proposed order, I suggest that you use the following language from
the Cobb case as a template:
Therefore, in accordance with the A.B.A. Updated
Civil Trial Standard 14 and the Sixth Circuit’s holding
in United States v. Johnson, Defendant’s Motion is
GRANTED. The Court will act in accordance with the
instruction as set forth in detail in the A.B.A. Updated
Civil Trial Standard 14 and Johnson. Further, the
Court will instruct the jury in accordance with
Johnson and the A.B.A. Updated Civil Trial Standard
14.
See, United States v. Cobb, CR-2-07-0236, 2008 WL 2120845
(S.D. Ohio May 19, 2008). (I have added the Civil Trial Standard
language; the Cobb case referred only to Johnson.)

CONCLUSION
I hope your nights are tender, especially these great Montana
summer evenings, but not your witness. Montana courts and
lawyers can take the high road, comply with A.B.A. Updated
Civil Trial Standard 14, and let juries assess the testimony of a
Rule 702 witness without being blinded by the gleam of a special
designation
Cynthia Ford is a professor at the University of Montana School of Law
where she teaches Civil Procedure, Evidence, Family Law, and Remedies.
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ENDNOTES
1 This is the title of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s fourth and last novel, originally published in 1934. Fitzgerald took the title from a line in a poem by Keats
entitled “Ode to a Nightingale.” See, being an English major has been helpful…
2 The extra language in the federal version which is not in the MRE results
from an attempt to codify the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court on
the requirements for admission of expert testimony. “Rule 702 has been
amended in response to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993), and to the many cases applying Daubert, including Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999).” Advisory Committee Note to
2000 Amendment of F.R.E. 702.
3 In Daubert, each side submitted affidavits from experts, opining on the
causal relationship between prenatal Bendectin and birth defects. The trial
judge excluded the plaintiffs’ affidavits, finding that the methodology used
by the plaintiffs’ experts did not meet the “general acceptance” standard
of reliability. (The Supreme Court’s decision imposed a new and different
standard, and remanded the case).
In Kumho Tire, the Court extended its Daubert analysis to engineering and
other technical but non-scientific specialized knowledge. The plaintiffs
opposed the defense motion for summary judgment with deposition
testimony from an expert in tire failure analysis, who concluded that a
manufacturing defect in the tire had caused the blowout which injured the
plaintiffs. The trial judge concluded that the plaintiffs’ expert’s methodol-

4

5

6
7

ogy fell short of the Daubert standard, excluded the affidavit and granted
summary judgment for the defense. The Supreme Court held that the trial
court had employed the correct standard, and did not abuse its discretion
in excluding the affidavit as based on insufficiently reliable methodology.
See, Kihega v. State, 392 S.W.3d 828 (Tex.App., 2013); In re Commitment of
Simmons, 2012 IL App (1st) 112375-U, Ill.App. 1 Dist.; State v. Barlow, 2010
WL 1687772, *12+, Tenn.Crim.App. (2010).
I myself am unclear about whether the Uniform District Court Rules apply
to all, or only civil, cases in Montana District Courts. There is nothing in
the UDCR themselves which addresses this issue, but they are located in
the MCA Title 26, which is entitled “Civil Procedure.” My intent is that the
expert witness process be the same in both civil and criminal trials.
While we are at it, why is Pretrial hyphenated as Pre-Trial in this rule?
Under Article VII of the M.R.E., the proponent can lay out the witness’ qualifications and then ask the opinion question, or simply ask the opinion
question right up front and then back it up with the witness’ qualifications
and reasoning. “The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference
and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts
or data, unless the court requires otherwise.” M.R.E. 705.
The first method is the more traditional, and leaves your opponent room
to object on foundation grounds. The middle, and my own personal,
choice is to do the qualification part, then ask for the opinion, then ask for
the reasons the witness came to that opinion, and then conclude with the
opinion again (technically this last question is redundant under Rule 403,
but if it’s quick, it usually works).

